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SWINGING BACK AND FORTH BETWEEN
IMPUNITY AND IMPEACHMENT: THE
STRUGGLE FOR JUSTICE IN LATIN
AMERICA AND THE INTERNATIONAL
CRIMINAL COURT
Alberto L. Zuppi*
I. INTRODUCTION: LATIN AMERICAN STRUGGLE
FOR DEMOCRACY
The dreadful experiences endured in Latin America during
the 1970's and 1980's evolved into a troubled transitional period
before democracy began to consolidate. In those two decades,
military rulers from all over the region displaced democratically
elected governments through the use of force, and imprisoned,
tortured and killed their opponents, including the baby-snatch-
ing cases or trafficking with the newborn of murdered prison-
ers.1 The term "desaparecido" was coined to name those who
disappeared without a trace after being arrested by members of
the security forces, burdening their relatives with the addi-
tional anguish of not knowing the fate of their loved ones. These
open wounds in the society were, and still are, difficult to patch.
The transition from a brutal dictatorship to democracy and the
dealing with the horrors of the past have been tried by almost
* Robert & Pamela Martin Associate Professor, Paul M. Hebert Law Center,
LSU. Any translation of a foreign text without mentioning a difference source was
performed by the author.
1 See generally PRISCILLA B. HAYNER, UNSPEAKABLE TRUTHS (2002); Jaime
Malamud Goti, State Terror and Memory of What?, 21 U. ARK. LITTLE ROCK L. R.
107 (1998). The most appealing document on this period is "Nunca Mis," or "Never
Again," an official report of the National Commission on the Disappearance of Per-
sons [in Spanish Comisi6n Nacional sobre la Desaparici6n de Personas, also known
by its acronym "CONADEP"], established in 1983 by Argentine President Raul Al-
fonsin. The CONADEP, chaired by the respected writer Ernesto SAbato, docu-
mented the cases of 8,960 persons who had been disappeared by the militaries.
Nunca Mds (Never Again), Report of CONADEP (National Commission on the Dis-
appearance of Persons) - 1984, translation available at http://www.desaparecidos.
org/nuncamas/web/english/library/nevagain/nevagain_000.htm (abridged version).
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each of the nations here involved in different ways, sometimes
risking acts of valiant defiance of the use of force sometimes
using more conciliatory arguments.
Argentina is a good example of the forced swinging back
and forth pace adopted in the region, oscillating between rein-
stalling democracy and justice, and consenting to impunity. Af-
ter its return to democracy, the Argentine justice system tried
to prosecute and even convict the members of successive mili-
tary juntas for the crimes perpetrated during those years. But,
when the main judgment against the de facto President of the
first military junta (Videla) and his accomplices was being en-
forced, Argentine President Alfonsin, under an increased mili-
tary pressure threatening to overthrow his government,
rendered two laws which interrupted the prosecutions of the re-
maining members of the armed forces involved in the brutal re-
pression. The first of those laws2 called for the mandatory
extinction of any legal action originated in acts perpetrated dur-
ing the dictatorship when the related claim had not been intro-
duced within a peremptory period of sixty days after the
publication of the law in the Official Gazette ("Boletin Oficial"
or "B.O."). The second law3 presumed iure et de iure that any act
perpetrated during the dictatorship, by anyone from the rank of
colonel down to private, was done in fulfillment of due obedi-
ence of superior orders. Later, the labile government of Presi-
dent Menem declared an amnesty benefiting even those few like
Videla and other members of the military junta who were in
military prisons convicted of crimes committed during the dicta-
torship of 1976-1983. These developments imposed upon Argen-
tine society a palpable sense of impunity, which was increased
in 1987 when the Argentine Supreme Court upheld the consti-
tutionality of both laws. 4
2 Law No. 23492, Dec. 29, 1986, 26058 B. 0., [XLVII-A] A.D.L.A., 192. known
as the "Final Stop Law" or "Ley de Punto Final."
3 Law No. 23531, Jun. 9, 1987, 26155 B.O., [XLVII-B] A.D.L.A. 1548, known
as the "Due Obedience Law" or "Ley de Obediencia Debida."
4 See CSJN, 22/6/1987, "Ram6n Camps," Fallos 310: 1162, L.L. 1987-D, 194.
See also MARCELO SANCINETTI, DERECHOS HUMANOS EN LA ARGENTINA POST-DICTA-
TORIAL 126 et seq. (1988). Only several years later, on March 6, 2001, did a federal
judge declare the unconstitutionality of both laws in the case Juzg. Fed Crim. Cor-
rec. No. 4-, 6/3/2001, "Simon, Julio, et al." Jurisprudencia Argentina [J.A.]
2001-11, 240, available at http://hrlibrary.ngo.ru/research/argentinajfcc4-cavallo.




The perceptible hesitation of the newborn democracies was
not only present in Argentina. Uruguay still today maintains
similar legislation. 5 Although Bolivia convicted former presi-
dent Garcia Meza in 1993,6 it conceded a de facto impunity to
another human rights violator and former military ruler, Hugo
Banzer.7 Chile assured the impunity of the former members of
the Pinochet dictatorship by allowing their participation in the
subsequent governments with life positions and by the use of
general amnesties.8 Brazil issued a general amnesty in 1979,
and in 2002 decided that the official archives of the dictatorship
both laws by Law 25.779 of August 21, 2003, and on June 14, 2005, the Argentine
Supreme Court revoked its prior decision and ruled the unconstitutionality of both
laws. See CSJN, 14/6/2005, "Sim6n, Julio H6ctor y otros s/ privaci6n ilegitima de la
libertad, etc. - J.A. 2005-IV, 378, available at http://www.derechos.org/nizkor/arg/
doc/nulidad.html (in Spanish) (last visited Mar. 13, 2008). The Simon case was
judged again on August, 8, 2006, sentencing the main accused to 25 years in
prison. See Christine A. Bakker, A Full Stop to Amnesty in Argentina: The Simon
Case, 3 J. INT'L CRIM. JUSTICE, 1106 (2005). For a conclusive and enrapturing dis-
cussion of the topic, see generally NAOMI ROHT-ARRIAZA, THE PINOCHET EFFECT:
TRANSNATIONAL JUSTICE IN THE AGE OF HUITsN RIGHTS (2005) (discussing the
evolution of developments in the region, before and after Pinochet).
5 See Law No. 15848, Dec. 22, 1986, (Uru.), known as "Ley de Caducidad de
la Pretensi6n Punitiva del Estado," available at http://www.parlamento.gub.uy/
leyes/AccesoTextoLey.asp?Ley=15848&Anchor= (in Spanish); see also Report No.
29/92 of the Inter-American Commission on Human Rights regarding the case of
Mendoza et. al., v. Uruguay, Case No 10029, et. al., available at http://www.cidh.
org/annualrep/92englUruguayl0.029.htm (1992) (last visited Mar. 13, 2008). The
Inter American Commission on Human Rights (IACHR) found the law in violation
of basic human rights treaties in force in Uruguay.
6 See Corte Suprema de Justicia, 21/4/1993, "Sentencia Pronunciada en los
Juicios de Responsabilidad Seguidos por el Ministerio Publico y Coadyuvantes con-
tra Luis Garcia Meza y sus Colaboradores," (Bol.) available at http://www.der-
echos.org/nizkor/bolivia/doc/meza.html (in Spanish) (last visited Mar. 13, 2008).
7 Andean Information Network, Continued Impunity Could Aggravate Pend-
ing Political Conflict., Dec. 2005, available at http://juiciogoniya.org.bo/verad.php?
id=77 (last visited Mar. 13, 2008).
8 The military rulers self-conceded an amnesty in 1978, see Decree Law No.
2191 of 1978, and later in 1980 after a referendum modified the 1925 Constitution
to allow former presidents to become lifetime senators when they leave office. See
article 31 of the 1980 Chilean Constitution. English translation available at http://
confinder.richmond.edu/admin/docs/Chile.pdf. The Constitution was amended
again in September 2005 to abolish the senator-for-life provision of the former arti-
cle 31. See Constituci6n Chile 1980, as reformed through 2005, available at http:ll
www.gobiernodechile.cl/viewEstado.aspx?idArticulo=22484 (last visited Apr. 11,
2008). See also Report No. 36/96 of the IACHR Regarding the Case of Garay
Hermosilla et al. v. Chile, Case 10843, (1996), available at http://www.cidh.org/
annualrep/96engIChile10843.htm (last visited Mar. 13, 2008). However, the 1978
amnesty by Decree 2191 continues to be applicable even today.
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must remain closed for fifty years.9 Paraguay, which had a dic-
tator installed for 35 years, simply did nothing.10 But these are
just a few examples of other similar cases. 1 Even years after
democracy has been restored in countries of the region the af-
fected society was sharply divided between those who saw in
the prior military intervention in politics an effective defense
against the menace of communism -justifying the crimes per-
petrated as "excesses during a dirty war"'12 - and those taking
the side of the victims. On both sides, accusations of crimes,
cover-ups, pacts of silence within the armed forces, and the ac-
quiescence by major parts of the society to what happened in
the past, are issues still present. This antagonism was shown in
the conflict between those who were convinced that forgiveness
and oblivion were the only available means for dealing with the
past, and those who called for unlimited and unrestricted jus-
tice.13 To overcome this situation, the critical roles played by
human rights groups, the press, some members of the court and
a few engaged legal practitioners were fundamental.
The considerable changes in international law and interna-
tional criminal law in the 1990's were observed with hope in
Latin America. The fate of Pinochet in London electrified the
9 See Law No. 6683, August 28, 1979 (Brazil), available at https://www.
planalto.gov.br/ccivil_03/leis/16683.htm (last visited Mar. 13, 2008). Current Presi-
dent Lula da Silva revoked the decree closing the archives and promised to re-open
them, which at the time of this Article was still due.
10 See Alfredo Stroessner, Dictator of Paraguay, ECONOMIST, Aug. 24, 2006, at
71. On August 16, 2006, former Paraguayan dictator Alfredo Stroessner died at
age 93 in a hospital in Brazil where he was in exile.
11 See Brian Loveman, Protected Democracies and Military Guardianship:
Political Transitions in Latin America 1978-1993, 36 J. INTER-AM. STUD. & WORLD
AFF. 105 (1994).
12 See Monte Peel, Argentine 'Dirty War' Trials Revive Old Fears, Hostilities,
WASH. POST, Oct. 20, 2006, at A15, available at http://www.washingtonpost.com/
wp-dynlcontent/article/2006/10/19/AR2006101901605.html?nav=rssworld (last
visited Mar. 13, 2008).
13 See Emilio F. Bignone, Cynthia L. Estlund & Samuel Issacharoff, Dictator-
ship on Trial: Prosecution of Human Rights violations in Argentina, 10 YALE J.
INT'L L. 118 (1984-85); Carlos S. Nino, The Human Rights Policy of the Argentine
Constitutional Government: A Reply, 11 YALE J. INT'L L. 217 (1985-86); Kathryn J.
Zoglin, The National Security Doctrine and the State of Siege in Argentina: Human
Rights Denied, 12 SUFFOLK TRANSNAT'L L. J. 266 (1989); Alejandro M. Garro, Nine
Years of Transition to Democracy in Argentina: Partial Failure or Qualified Suc-




region. 14 The establishment of the international ad hoc tribu-
nals for the former Yugoslavia and for Rwanda, as well as the
preparation of the Rome Statute for an International Criminal
Court (ICC), refreshed the idea of the existence of crimes con-
sidered to be against mankind, as well as tribunals for prosecut-
ing international criminals. In the momentum created after the
Pinochet case, 15 some of those attempts to break impunity were
successful and revision of the past has finally begun in some
countries, sometimes more than thirty years after the fact, as it
happened with Argentina. 16
This paper deals with two main aspects of the immunity
shielding former and current heads of state in Latin America. I
will analyze in the first section of this article how their immu-
nity has been considered by the constitutional texts of several
states in the region. I will look for possible contradictions be-
tween those texts and the irrelevance of any official immunity
asserted by the Rome Statute establishing the ICC. In the sec-
ond part, I will refer to some practical strategies developed in
the region, specifically by human rights groups and legal practi-
tioners, to fight impunity before the tribunals. I will explain
how they were helpful in illuminating the right path to follow
and in pushing governments to engage in introspection into
their own pasts.
II. THE ROME STATUTE AND THE IMMUNITIES FOR THE
HEAD OF STATES IN LATIN AMERICA
Of the 20 states that constitute Latin America, 14 have al-
ready ratified the Rome Statute establishing the International
Criminal Court (ICC). 17 In spite of several projects launched for
implementing the Rome Statute, at the time of writing this Ar-
14 See World Pinochet Supporters Protest in London, BBC News, Oct. 19,
1998, available at http://news.bbc.co.uk/2/hi/196570.stm (last visited Mar. 13,
2008).
15 See ROHT-ARRIAZA supra note 4.
16 See "Ram6n Camps" and "Simon, Julio, et al." supra note 4, for the evolu-
tion of the cases Camps and Simon as well as for further references.
17 See Coalition for the International Criminal Court, States Parties to the
Rome Statute of the ICC, According to the General Assembly Regional Groups,
http://www.iccnow.org/documents/RatificationsbyUNGroup-18July07.pdf (last vis-
ited Mar. 13, 2008). In Latin America, 14 nations have become parties to the ICC:
Argentina, Bolivia, Brazil, Colombia, Costa Rica, Dominican Republic, Ecuador,
Honduras, Mexico, Panama, Paraguay, Peru, Uruguay and Venezuela. See id.
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ticle only Uruguay and Argentina have been able to implement
legislation for adapting their national laws to the Rome
Statute.18
Other countries have already introduced projects for gen-
eral laws of implementation, which are at different levels of the
parliamentary debate. 19 A few nations are still engaged in a
step before the congressional debate, holding constitutional dis-
cussions related to the compatibility of the Statute and domes-
tic law.20
Several points of conflict have been identified between the
Rome Statute and domestic Latin American legislation. 21 An
18 See Law No. 18.026, Sep. 25, 2006, D.O, (Digesto Oficial) Oct. 4, 2006
(Uru.), available at http: / / www.parlamento.gub. uy / leyes /AccesoTextoLey.asp?Ley
=18026&Anchor= (last visited Mar. 19, 2008); Law No. 26.200, Jan. 9, 2007, 31069
B.O. (Arg.), available at http://www.iccnow.org/documents/Ley-de-implementa-
cion-argentina2.pdf (last visited Mar. 13, 2008). For the author's criticisms of the
Project that was finally approved as Law 26.200, B.O. January 9, 2007, see Alberto
L. Zuppi, Implementando los delitos tipificados en el Estatuto de Roma en el Der-
echo Argentino, in LA APLICACI6N DE LOS TRATADOs SOBRE DERECHOS HUMANOS EN
EL AMBITO LOCAL - LA EXPERIENCIA DE UNA DIACADA 297 (V. Abramovich et al. eds,
2007).
19 Some projects for adapting domestic legislation are still being considered by
the respective parliaments, as it happens, among others with Brazil and Colombia.
See Fatima da Camara, Brazil: ICC Implementation Process Stalled, INT'L CRIM.
CT. MONITOR, Aug. 2005, at 6, available at http://www.wfm.org/site/index.php?
module=uploads&func=download&fileId=211 (last visited Mar. 13, 2008); Colom-
bian Draft Bill on Cooperation with the ICC, Nov. 2005, available at http://www.
iccnow.org/documents/ColombiaCooperationBillDraft Nov05_es.pdf (last visited
Mar. 13, 2008).
20 As it happens, for example, with Ecuador and Mexico. On January 28,
2008, the Representative of Ecuador at the Organization of American States (OAS)
informed that, in spite of having ratified the Rome Statute as State number fifty-
two, a domestic commission is still considering the necessary legislation for imple-
menting the Rome Statute. See report entitled Sesi6n de Trabajo sobre la Corte
Penal Internacional (Ecuador) (in Spanish), available at http://scm.oas.org/
doc..public/SPANISH/HIST_08/CP19599T04.doc (last visited Apr. 11, 2008). At
the end of 2006, the Mexican Ambassador before the Assembly of State Parties of
the ICC informed that a bill was going to be sent to the Congress implementing
legislation for adapting the Rome Statute. However, nothing happened at the time
of writing this Article. See report entitled 5th Session of the Assembly of States
Parties of the Rome Statute of the International Criminal Court; Intervention by the
Ambassador of Mexico, H.E. Sandra Fuentes-Berain, available at http://www.
iccnow.org/documents/MexicoGeneralDebate_23Nov06_Eng.pdf (last visited Apr.
11, 2008).
21 See INTER-AM. JURIDICAL COMM., Promotion of the International Criminal
Court, Document OEA/Ser. G CP/doc.41111 at 7-8 (2006), available at http://www.
oas.org/DIL/CP-doc_4111-06_eng.pdf (last visited Mar. 13, 2008). According to the
research conducted in May 2006 by the Inter-American Juridical Committee of the
6http://digitalcommons.pace.edu/pilr/vol19/iss2/3
INTERNATIONAL CRIMINAL COURT
extensive analysis of all conflicting points between the criminal
law in Latin American nations and the Rome Statute is beyond
the scope of this research, which will be restricted to the analy-
sis of immunities and other non-exculpatory defenses such as
amnesties and presidential pardons.
1. General Constitutional Changes
Brazil was able to reform the constitution, adapting its
provisions to the Rome Statute. 22 The most significant aspect of
the reform was the express submission of Brazil to the jurisdic-
tion of the ICC23 This clear recognition of Brazil should be com-
pared with the idea contained in other Latin American
constitutional texts discussing the hierarchy of international
law in general, or international human rights law in particular
with the constitutional norms.24 Colombia expressly declared
Organization of American States (OAS), among member states, the main conflict-
ing points between the Rome Statute and the domestic legal orders are the follow-
ing: a) Article 20 ICC and the ne bis in idem principle in domestic cases when the
court was seen as not constituted independently or impartially, with the due proce-
dural warranties recognized by international law; b) Article 27 ICC and the irrele-
vance of the official capacity; c) Article 54 para. 2 ICC and the extensive legal
authority conceded to the prosecutor, who is permitted to conduct investigations in
the territory of a state, what has been seen conflictive with national sovereignty; d)
Articles 59 and 89 ICC related with the arrest and surrender from nationals to the
ICC; e) Article 77 ICC and life imprisonment which is not contemplated by several
Latin American countries; and f) The question of amnesties and presidential par-
dons. Id. at 7-8. To this list should be added the question of recognizing another
judicial jurisdiction and the consequent erosion of domestic sovereignty, as well as
the establishment in the local legislation of the crimes contemplated in article 5 of
the Rome Statute.
22 See Constituido Federal [C.F.] (Brazil), amended December 30, 2004,
available at https://www.planalto.gov.br/ccivil-03/Constituicao/Emendas/Emc/
emc45.htm (last visited Apr. 11, 2008).
23 See id. art. 5,91 4 ("0 Brasil se submete d jurisdiqeo de Tribunal Penal Inter-
nacional a cuja criaqdo tenha manifestado adesdo." [Brazil submits itself to the
jurisdiction of the International Criminal Court to which creation it adheres.]).
24 See id. art. 5, 3, (declaring that human rights treaties adopted with a
certain majority by both chambers of the Congress will be equivalent to a constitu-
tional amendment). Compare the same principle of Constituci6n Argentina
[CoNsT. ARG.] art. 75, 1 22 of the Argentine Constitution, available at http://www.
argentina.gov.ar/argentina/portal/documentos/constitucion ingles.pdf. In accor-
dance with the constitutional texts of Costa Rica, Ecuador and Guatemala, inter-
national treaties have a superior hierarchy than national laws. See Constituci6n
Costa Rica 1949, art. 7, available at http://www.asamblea.go.cr/proyecto/constitu/
const2.htm; Constituci6n Politica de la Repfiblica del Ecuador 1998, art. 163, avail-
able at http://www.presidencia.gov.ec/modulos.asp?id=115; Constituci6n Guate-
2007]
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that the parliament may recognize the jurisdiction of the ICC in
the terms reproduced in the Rome Statute already in 2001,25
although it also recognized that the Statute will not prevail over
a domestic order.26 Other countries, such as Paraguay and Ec-
uador, admit a general adherence to supranational institutions
without specific reference to the ICC.27
In Guatemala, the constitutional court issued an advisory
opinion relating to the constitutionality of the Rome Statute. 28
The opinion concluded that no issue of constitutionality arises
from the exclusive right to exercise jurisdictional functions by
the judiciary of Guatemala and the judicial functions of the
ICC 29 The same conclusion was obtained in advisory opinions
mala 1985, art. 46, available at http://pdba.georgetown.edu/Constitutions/Guate/
guate85.html. Colombia gives preference in its legal order to the human rights
treaties and prohibits their limitation by the executive or the legislative branches
during the so called periods of exception. See Constituci6n Colombia 1991, art. 93,
available at http://web.presidencia.gov.co/constitucion/index.pdf (last visited Apr.
11, 2008). The May 2006 draft for a penal code in Panama declares in article 5 that
the norms and principles of human rights included in the constitution and in inter-
national treaties in force in Panama are integrated into the code. The draft was to
be discussed in March 2007. See Don Winner, Final Vote on Penal Code Reforms to
be Held in March, PANAMA GUIDE, Feb. 24, 2007, http://www.panama-guide.coml
article.php/20070224100726295 (last visited Apr. 11, 2008). In Bolivia there is a
clear position related to human rights treaties: the constitutional tribunal decided
in the case SC 1663/2003 that the declarations and treaties concerning human
rights are part of the legal order applicable in Bolivia. See Jos6 Antonio Rivera,
Tribunal Constitucional y Proteccidn de los Derechos Humanos, REVISTA DEL CEN-
TRO DE ESTUDIOS CONSTITUTIONALEs, 227, 236, (2004), available at http://www.
cecoch.cllhtmrevista/docs/estudiosconst/ln_2_2004/arts/227_254.pdf (in Spanish)
(last visited Mar. 13, 2008).
25 See Constituci6n Colombia 1991, art 93 (2005). Text introduced by Act 2 of
December 27, 2001 (in Spanish), available at http://www.secretaria senado.gov.co/
leyes/CONSP91.HTM (last visited Apr. 11, 2008).
26 Id.
27 See Constituci6n Ecuador 1998, art. 161(4); Constituci6n Paraguay 1992,
art. 145, available at http://www.servat.unibe.chlicl/paOOOOO-.html (last visited
Mar. 13, 2008).
28 See Corte de Constitucionalidad, 25/3/2002, "Expediente No. 171-2002,"
(Guat.), available at http://www.iccnow.org/documents/CCOpinionGuatemala02-
sp.pdf (in Spanish) (last visited Mar. 13, 2008).
29 See id. at 20. In a similar situation, however, a different conclusion was
reached by the Constitutional Tribunal of Chile interpreting the article 79 of the
Chilean Constitution and the administrative powers of the Chilean Supreme




produced by the supreme court of Costa Rica 30 and the consti-
tutional court in Ecuador.
The Argentine law implementing the Rome Statute in do-
mestic law31 remains silent on this issue as it happened in an-
other occasion with the country's adherence to another
international treaty including a judicial body as it happens with
the American Convention on Human Rights.32
The constitutional tribunal of Chile has been the only one
in Latin America that affirmed a clear incompatibility between
the provisions of the Rome Statute and the Chilean constitu-
tion.33 The main argument was the understanding that the
ICC, as a supranational tribunal with criminal jurisdiction,
could substitute for the Chilean tribunal, and such extension of
jurisdiction is not permitted in the actual constitution. 34
2. Constitutional Immunities of Head of States
In principle, all constitutions in Latin America recognize
some grade of immunity to the executive power. Even though
Article 27 of the Rome Statute declares the irrelevance of the
immunity of a head of state or government when the act con-
cerned is a crime for the jurisdiction of the ICC, this contradic-
tion has not been seen as a considerable impediment by most of
the Latin American states to their ratification of the Statute.35
Even when the constitution has been reformed for ratifying the
30 See Constitutional Chamber, 1/11/2000, "Consulta preceptiva de constitu-
cionalidad sobre el proyecto de ley de aprobaci6n del Estatuto de Roma de la Corte
Penal Internacional," Exp. 00-008325-0007-Co, Res. 2000-09685, available at
http://www.icrc.org/ihl-nat.nsf/276c23458e6a0d2441256486004ad099/cafa5b74f45
7664fc1256bla003f360a!OpenDocument (in Spanish with English summary) (last
visited Mar. 13, 2008).
31 See Law No. 26.200, supra note 18.
32 See Alberto L. Zuppi, El derecho imperativo (jus cogens) en el nuevo orden
internacional, 147 EL DERECHO 863, 874 (1992).
33 See Constituci6n Chile 1980, art. 73. See also Tribunal Constitucional, 9/4/
2002, available at http://www.iccnow.org/documents/fallo%20chile.pdf (in Span-
ish) (last visited Mar. 13, 2008) (decision regarding incompatibility between Rome
Statute and Constitution of Chile). For an opinion in favor of the constitutionality
of the Rome Statute, see Humberto Nogueira Alcald, Consideraciones sobre Consti-
tucionalidad del Estatuto de Roma del Tribunal Penal Internacional, IUs ET PRAXIS
363 (1999), available at http://redalyc.uaemex.mx/redalyc/pdf/197/19750214.pdf (in
Spanish) (last visited Mar. 13, 2008).
34 See Constituci6n Chile 1980, IT 31 and 46.
35 See Helen Duffy, National Constitutional Compatibility and the Interna-
tional Criminal Court, 11 DuKE J. COMP. & INT'L L. 5, 26 (2001).
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ICC generally the question of the presidential immunity re-
mained untouched. For example, in 2005, after introducing a
constitutional reform, Mexico was able to ratify the Rome Stat-
ute.36 Some scholars proposed an amendment for the contradic-
tion between Article 27 of the ICC and the Mexican
constitution, but the opinions on the subject differ. 37 The consti-
tutions of Colombia, 38 Costa Rica 39 and Nicaragua 40 explain
that the head of state cannot be prosecuted during the mandate,
and the constitution of Paraguay forbids even subpoenaing the
president. 41 The majority of the Latin American nations, al-
though expressly or implicitly recognizing immunities for their
officials, use a positive drafting of the principle, explaining the
reasons that will permit the prosecution of the head of state or
his ministers. Mexico, for example, rules that during his man-
date the president can be charged with the crime of treason
36 See Decreto por el que se Adiciona el Artfculo 21 de la Constituci6n Politica
de los Estados Unidos Mexicanos [Decree adding Article 21 to the Political Consti-
tution of the United Mexican States], Diario Oficial de la Federaci6n [D.O.1, 20 de
Junio de 2005 (Mex.), available at http://www.ordenjuridico.gob.mx/JurInt/
CORTEPENAL.pdf.
37 See Sergio Gonzilez Gdlvez, La Corte Penal Internacional: Posibilidades y
Problemas, 47 DERECHOS HUMANOS 137 (2001), available at http://www.juridi-
cas.unam.mx/publicaflibrev/rev/derhum/cont/47/pr/pr23.pdf; but see Natalia Cafrfz
Garcia, Constitucionalidad del Estatuto de Roma y realidad juridico-politica en
Mexico bajo la perspectiva del derecho comparado, 3 ANUARIO MEXICANO DE DER-
ECHO INTERNACIONAL 107, 114 (2003) (making a better argument against the
amendment) (in Spanish), available at http://info.juridicas.unam.mx/publica/
librev/rev/derint/cont/3/art/art4.pdf (last visited Apr. 11, 2008). See also Socorro
Flores Liera, Ratification of the Statute of the International Criminal Court by
Mexico, in STATE'S RESPONSES TO ISSUES ARISING FROM THE ICC STATUTE: CONSTI-
TUTIONAL, SOVEREIGNTY, JUDICIAL COOPERATION AND CRIMINAL LAW 275-80 (2005).
38 See Constituci6n Colombia 1991, art. 199. The prosecution should be only
before the congress, unless the senate has already declared the prosecution as
admissible.
39 See Constituci6n Costa Rica 1949, art. 151.
40 See Constituci6n Politica de la Repfiblica de Nicaragua [Cn.] [Constitution]
art. 14, La Gaceta [L.G.] 9 January 1987, as amended by Ley No. 527, Reforma
Parcial a la Constituci6n Politica de la Repdblica de Nicaragua, Apr. 8, 2005, avail-
able at http://pdba.georgetown.edu/Constitutions/Nica/nica05.html (last visited
Apr. 11, 2008). In 1990, Nicaragua issued the so-called "Ley de Inmunidad," - im-
munity law- which explained that all functionaries can be detained in case of a
flagrant commission of a crime. See Ley No. 140, 28 November 1991, Ley de In-
munidad [Law of Immunity], La Gaceta [L.G.], 15 June, 1992 (Nicar.), available at
http://www.glin.gov'download.action?Fulltectld=45921&documentld=37650 (au-
thor's comment).
41 See Constituci6n Paraguay 1992, art. 193.
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against the State and other grave crimes against the common
order in what seems to be an open, albeit unprecedented, alter-
native to initiating an impeachment proceeding.4 2 In Bolivia,
a draft circulating in October 200543 called for a constitutional
reform, limiting the immunities of the representatives of the
congress up to the perpetration of crimes against international
human rights.44 In a subsequent article, the congress is re-
lieved from authorizing the impeachment before the Supreme
Court of the president, vice-president or ministers in cases of
crimes against international human rights and international
humanitarian rules. 45 In Colombia, the question of immunity
was considered by the constitutional court, 46 but not seen as
problematic for the acceptance of the Rome Statute. Another
point considered by this tribunal was in reference to Article 17
of the Rome Statute, and whether the consideration of amnes-
ties and presidential pardons as a reason for not investigating a
case could be acceptable. 47 The decision finally considered that
amnesties and presidential pardons that warranted the victim's
access to justice should be seen as instruments for consolidating
internal peace and accordingly coherent with Article 80 of the
ICC.48
42 See Constituci6n Polftica de los Estados Unidos Mexicanos [Const.], as
amended, Diario Oficial de la Federaci6n [D.O.], 20 de Junio de 2005 (Mex.), avail-
able at http://info4.juridicas.unam.mx/ijure/fed/9/109.htm?s- (last visited Apr. 11,
2008). See also Gdlvez, supra note 37; Garcia, supra note 37, at 114.
43 See Anteproyecto de Ley de Adecuaci6n Normativa al Estatuto de la Corte
Penal Internacional [Proposed Law Regarding Adequacy Regulations of the Stat-
ute of the ICC] (Bol.) (in Spanish), available at http://www.iccnow.org/documents/
BoliviaDraftImplementationBillOctO5.pdf (last visited Apr. 11, 2008).
44 See id. proposed drafting of art. 5lat 7.
45 See id. proposed drafting of arts. 11.8 and 96.13. at 8-9. Article 96.13 of this
draft even prevents the president from conceding of amnesty in cases of crimes
against international human rights or international humanitarian norms.
46 See Revision of Law 742 of June 5, 2002, Judgment C-578/02, LAT-223, I .
4, 5, Constitutional Court, July 30, 2002 (Colom.), available at http://www.
secretariasenado.gov.co/leyes/SC578_02.HTM (last visited Apr. 11, 2008).
47 A similar question was posed in Peru in relation with article 102.6 of the
Peruvian Constitution. See Chamorro Balvin & Llatas Ramirez, Implementaci6n
del derecho interno al Estatuto de Roma de la Corte Penal Internacional con espe-
cial 6nfasis al C6digo Penal, at 32, available at http://www.cajpe.org.pelRIJ/bases/
dpi/documento.pdf (last visited Apr. 11, 2008).
48 See Judgment, supra note 36, % 4.1.2.1.7.
20071 205
11
PACE INT'L L. REV. [Vol. 19:195
Peru49 has produced several proposals to reform its consti-
tution,50 and to exclude the protection of immunity in cases of
crimes against humanity. In addition to the crime of treason,
the president could be accused of impeding elections, dissolving
the congress, or hindering its meetings. 51 Panama 52 enlarges
the list of presidential crimes, to include even "to overstep his
[presidential] constitutional functions."5 3 Another group of na-
tions, including Ecuador54 and Guatemala,55 leave the re-
sponsibility to impeach the president to the congress. In
Guatemala, the question of impeachment directed to certain of-
ficers is the objective of one specific law.56 Although its text rec-
ognizes a certain degree of immunity to those functionaries
shielded by the law, the immunity ends when the person ceases
to hold his/her office. 57 The constitution of Chile58 mentions as
a cause for prosecution "grave violations against the constitu-
49 See, e.g. Constituci6n Perd 1993, art. 117, available at http://www.tc.gob.pe/
legconperu/constitucion.html (last visited Apr. 11, 2008).
50 See Law No. 27,600, December 16, 2001 (Peru) (proposing the non-applica-
tion of the statute of limitations for crimes against humanity and war crimes, as
well as the prohibition of amnesties, graces or presidential pardons for these kinds
of crimes). For a summary of the law, see Chamorro Balvin & Llatas Ramirez,
supra note 48, at 10 (in Spanish), available at http://www.cajpe.org.pe/RIJ/bases/
dpi/documento.pdf.
51 A Peruvian congressman qualified extension of the parliamentary immuni-
ties of article 93 of the constitution as a frontal conflict with the Rome Statute. See
Balvn & Llatas Ramirez, supra note 38, at 34. Another document, however, pre-
pared by members of the congress, the International Committee of the Red Cross
and the Andean Commission of Jurist, declined the modification of article 93 of the
Peruvian Constitution, but recognized the problem with the presidential immunity
of its article 117. See id.
52 See Constituci6n Panama, art. 186 (1972) available at http://bdig-
ital.binal.ac.pa/bdp/const/Constitucion1941.pdf (last visited Apr. 11, 2008). See
also art. 314 (punishing the violation of immunity of a foreign head of state, or
offending his dignity or decorum). A similar text can be found in article 136 of the
penal code of Bolivia, in article 284 of the penal code of Costa Rica, and a more
restricted version in article 221 of the Argentine Penal Code.
53 See art. 186.1, supra note 53.
54 Constituci6n Ecuador 1998, art. 130(9). The list of crimes authorizing im-
peachment includes crimes against the state security extortion, bribery, and illegal
enrichment. See id.
55 See Constituci6n Guatemala 1985, art. 165(h).
56 See Dec. No. 85-2002 from December 17, 2002, "Ley en Materia de
Antejuicios" (Guat.) (in Spanish), available at http://www.scribd.com/doc/534603/
DECRETO-NUMERO-852002-LEY-EN-MATERIA-DE-ANTEJUICIO (last visited
Apr. 11, 2008).
57 See id., art. 3.
58 See Constituci6n Chile 1980, art. 48(2)(a).
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tion," and the text of Uruguay's 59 makes a short reference to
"grave crimes." The Dominican Republic conveys the ques-
tion of presidential responsibility to its high court, which will
decide accordingly whether the President committed a crime
permitting his/her prosecution. 60
The question of immunity presents some additional un-
resolved problems as could be seen in some of the legislative
drafts which have been introduced. For example, the Bolivian
original project for implementing in domestic law the Rome
Statute contains a peculiar reference to the treatment of the im-
munities recognized by international law to any official of a
member State of the ICC.61 The provision affirms that those in-
ternational immunities will not represent an impediment for
the exercise of the Bolivian jurisdiction. However, if the official
belongs to a non-member state immunity will be respected un-
less expressly waived by that state. The 2002 project of Brazil
contains a declaration that follows the principles of the Rome
Statute, asserting that the exercise of an official position, either
civilian or military, will not exempt the agent from prosecu-
tion.6 2 The application of military rules for members of the
armed forces has even survived some of the projects for imple-
menting the Rome Statute.6 3 The law of implementation of the
59 See Constituci6n Uruguay 1997, art. 93 ("violation of the Constitution and
other grave crimes... "); id. at art. 172 (related to the impeachment proceeding),
available at http://www.rau.edu.uy/uruguay/const97-1.6.htm#5 (last visited Apr.
11, 2008).
60 See Constituci6n de la Repdiblica Dominicana 2002, art. 67, available at
http://www.suprema.gov.do/codigos/Constitucion.pdf (last visited Apr. 11, 2008).
61 See Bolivian Project art. 7. Copy archived with the author. In accordance
with Prof. Elizabeth Santalla Vargas, who advised the Government on the original
draft, the Project since her participation has been modified several times, and is
still under consideration of the Chamber of Deputies. Letter archived with the
author.
62 See Brazilian Project art. 9 ("0 exercisio de cargo ou funqco oficial, civil ou
militar, ndo eximird o agente da responsabilidade penal, nem poderd, per se, con-
stituir motivo para reduqdo da pena." [The exercise of an official function, civil or
military, will not exempt the agent from criminal liability neither be a motive for
reduction of punishment]). Copy of the Project archived with the author. At the
time of writing this paper, the draft seems to be stalled at the Ministry of Justice
and has not been yet presented to the Congress. See Coalition for the International
Criminal Court, Regional & Country Info, http://www.iccnow.org/?mod=country&
iduct=24 (last visited Apr. 11, 2008).
63 See, e.g.,"Disposici6n Transitoria" of the 2005 Colombian project related to
the military jurisdiction entitled "Proyecto de Ley No. . . . 'Por la cual se dictan
normas sobre cooperaci6n con la Corte Penal Internacional,'" (in Spanish), availa-
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Rome Statute in Uruguay, on the contrary, excludes the grave
crimes included in the Statute from the application of military
jurisdiction, or their possible qualification as military crimes, or
the mere idea of being perpetrated upon official military
functions .64
In connection with the ratification process of the ICC, some
Latin American nations prepared detailed drafts including
questions on procedural cooperation with the ICC, as is the case
of Argentina, Colombia and Venezuela. At the time of this pa-
per, Uruguay and Argentina were the only Latin American
countries that had sanctioned national law implementing the
Rome Statute.65
3. Bringing Human Rights Offenders Before the Criminal
Courts: The case of Argentina
All Latin American states, with the sole exception of Argen-
tina, resolved questions of foreign state immunity using judicial
precedents of former decisions. 66 Argentina is the only country
of a civil law legal family which has enacted specific legislation
on immunity as it has been generally done by nations of the
common law tradition.67 This law has resolved the former ten-
dency problem of the Argentine Supreme Court to favor abso-
lute foreign state immunity, unless immunity has been
expressly waived. Article 2, paragraph (e) of the Argentine law
prohibits invoking jurisdictional immunity unless the claim is
ble at http://www.iccnow.org/documents/ColombiaCooperationBillDraftNov05_
es.pdf (last visited Apr. 11, 2008). The Brazilian code of military justice in article
208 includes the crime of genocide when perpetrated by militaries. See Decreto-Lei
No. 1.001, de 21 de outubro de 1969 (Brazil), (in Portuguese), available at http://
www.soleis.adv.br/codigopenalmilitar.htm (last visited Apr. 11, 2008).
64 See Law No. 18.026, Sept. 25, 2006, art. 11 (Uru.) (in Spanish), available at
http://www.parlamento.gub.uy/leyes/AccesoTextoLey.asp?Ley=18026&Anchor=
(last visited Apr. 11, 2008).
65 See Law 26.200, supra note 23.
66 However, the Argentine law shows perhaps a future trend in Latin
America. Recently, a detailed project for a law on foreign immunity was introduced
in the Mexican congress. See Iniciativa que contiene proyecto de decreto por el que
se expide la ley sobre inmunidad de jurisdicci6n estatal, (Mex.), available at
http: / /www.pan.senado.gob.mx/LVIII-LIX/descarga.php?id=26-296&ext=pdf (last
visited Apr. 11, 2008).
67 See Law 24488, June 28, 1995, 28173 B.O., 1995-D A.D.L.A. 4339, available
at http://infoleg.mecon.gov.ar/infoleglnternet/anexos/20000-24999/225231norma.




for losses or damages derived from delicts and quasi-delicts.
The text of the law should be construed as referring only to civil
claims, and not extending the jurisdiction of the Argentine
courts to penal law. In addition, one of the most conspicuous
gaps in the Argentine law is that by being concerned only with
the question of immunity of jurisdiction, it leaves out of consid-
eration the immunity of enforcement or execution restricting
the enforcement powers of the national courts. This omission
has been pointed out by the Argentine jurisprudence. 68 In spite
of a considerable number of decisions after issuance of the law,
none of the cases discussed the conflict between state immunity
and violation of principles belonging to jus cogens.69
a.) Presidential Pardons
Argentine courts had been reluctant not only to consider
any exception to immunity in general, but until very recently
they were unwilling to resolve questions on the grave crimes
committed during a special dark period of Argentina's history.
This produced some interesting situations when discussing de-
fenses of immunity which could be repeated in cases of immu-
nity of heads of state. For example, a German Prosecutor in
Nirnberg-Furth requested the extradition of General Carlos
Suarez Mason, 70 one of the main actors in the dictatorship that
ruled Argentina between 1976 and 1983.71 The charge posed for
the extradition request was the disappearance, torture and
68 See Blass6n, Beatriz Lucrecia Graciela ci Embajada de la Rep ablica Es-
lovaca, J. A. 2000-IV, at 641.
69 The Supreme Court could have opined in relation with this conflict in the
2006 claim against Luo Gan, Secretary of the Falun Gong, for the crime of genocide
and torture, one of several prosecutions initiated by the same actors around the
world. The opinion of the court was that although Lou Gan may enjoy immunity,
he wasn't at the present in Argentina where his visit was for just a few days. Ques-
tions on universal jurisdiction or conflict between immunity and jus cogens were
omitted in the decision of the Argentine Supreme Court. See CSJN, 23/2/2006,
"Luo Gan s/ imposici6n de tortura," L. 38, XLII, available at http://www.csjn.
gov.ar/documentos/cfal3/cons fallos.jsp (in field entitled "N' de expediente" enter:
L 38 XLII and click "Buscar;" then select "VER" link next to second document in
query result) (last visited Apr. 13, 2008).
70 See In re Extradition of Suarez-Mason, 694 F. Supp 676 (N.D. Cal. 1988).
See also Press information available at http://www.justiz.bayern.de/olgnipresse/
info/straf/prsl20.htm. Suarez Mason died in June 2005.
71 See Suarez Mason, Carlos Guillermo, ENCYCLOPEDIA BRITANNICA ONLINE,
http://www.britannica.com/eb/article-9403725/Suarez-Mason-Carlos-Guillermo
(last visited Apr. 11, 2008).
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death of a German citizen, Elisabeth Kasemann. 72 When the in-
tervening Argentine federal judge denied the extradition based
on the blanket amnesty and presidential pardon of all crimes
committed by the military rulers conceded by the Argentine
government, Germany, acting as a party in the extradition pro-
ceeding, appealed the denial of extradition instead of accepting
the Argentine refusal.73 Germany contended that granting the
excuse of amnesty and presidential pardon for crimes against
humanity contradicted mandatory norms ofjus cogens prohibit-
ing this kind of non-exculpatory defenses when the crime con-
cerned is an international crime. 74 The situation was rather
unique: a state requesting extradition appealed the domestic
decision denying it before the supreme court of the requested
state.75 The basis of the appeal was double: first, the assertion
that conceding a presidential pardon in cases of crimes against
72 See Suarez Mason, Carlos G. S. Extradici6n, no. 11819/01 at the Juzgado
Nacional en lo Criminal y Correccional Federal N' 4, Secretaria n' 7, (Arg.), avail-
able at http://www.nuncamas.org/juicios/argentin/smason 041201.htm (last visited
Apr. 11, 2008); No. 3886.4 at the Cdmara Nacional de Casaci6n Penal, available at
http://www.abogarte.com.ar/apelacionzuppi.html (last visited Apr. 11, 2008). See
also Andreas Fischer-Lescano, Vlkerrechtliche Praxis der Bundesrepublik
Deutschland in den Jahren 2000 bis 2002, in 64 ZEITSCHRIFT FOR AUSLANDISCHES
OFFENTLICHES RECHT UND VOLKERRECHT 195, 208-09 (2004). In relation with the
case IKsemann see also Kai Ambos & Christoph Grammer, La Responsabilidad de
la Conducci6n Militar Argentina por la Muerte de Elizabeth Kasemann, 16
CUADERNOS DE DOCTRINA Y JURISPRUDENCIA PENAL 163 (2003).
73 Article 25 of the Argentine extradition law, Law 24.767, allows that the
requested State could be represented at the proceeding by proxy holders. As a
party of the proceeding the requesting State is authorized to take any procedural
position following its interest. See Law No. 24.767, Jan. 16, 1997, 28565 B.O.,
LVII-A A.D.L.A. 40, available at http://www.cooperacion-penal.gov.ar/24767.htm
(last visited Apr. 11, 2008).
74 See Juan E. M6ndez, Accountability for Past Abuses, 19 HUM. RTS. Q. 255,
259 (1997); Jos6 Zalaquett, Moral Reconstruction in the Wake of Human Rights
Violations and War Crimes, in HARD CHOICES: MORAL DILEMMAS IN HUMANITARIAN
INTERVENTION 211, 220 (1998).
75 A rather unique situation. In the United States, the U.S. Attorney can sim-
ply reintroduce the request for extradition before a federal district court judge or
magistrate. See PAUST, BASsIOUNI, ET AL., INTERNATIONAL CRIMINAL LAw (3d ed.,
2007). In Mexico, when extradition has been denied, the requesting state may re-
submit the request to the Ministry of Foreign Affairs, and has no standing in court
to appeal the refusal. Most likely, it would be the Attorney General representing
the Requesting State's interests who could probably appeal; but this is still a diffi-
cult decision because the Attorney General has no say in the decision of the Minis-




humanity violated elementary principles of international law;
secondly, a presidential pardon granted in a judicial case before
any final decision has been reached violated the principles of
the Argentine Constitution. 76 The appeal did not discuss the
question of immunity originated in an official position, but
rather the resulting impunity obtained through a presidential
pardon wrongly conceded. The pardon of General Suarez Mason
was issued before his case could be decided by the tribunals and
consequently before the situation contemplated by the Argen-
tine Constitution as a presidential prerogative. The appeal in-
troduced by the German government was highly publicized by
the media, which created a rather uncomfortable situation for
the Argentine government. After the German appeal in the
Suarez Mason case was introduced, the government of then-
president De la Rua tried to close any possible gaps in the Ar-
gentine legislation to stop future similar situations. 77 Then, it
issued a decree declaring the so-called "official doctrine" that
consisted of refusing in limine already at the Ministry of For-
eign Affairs at the beginning of the proceeding any extradition
request involving accusations of crimes perpetrated during the
dictatorship. 78 The text of this decree was not only unfounded,
76 Current art. 99(5) of the Argentine Constitution affirms among the powers
of the Executive. The author's translation of the text reads: It may grant pardons
or commute CONVICTIONS for crimes subject to federal jurisdiction, after the report
of the corresponding court, except in cases of indictment by the Chamber of Depu-
ties. ["Puede indultar o conmutar las penas por delitos sujetos a la jurisdicci6n
federal, previo informe del tribunal correspondiente, excepto en los casos de acusa-
ci6n por la Cdmara de Diputados."] Constituci6n Argentina [CONST. ARG.], art.
99(5) (Arg.).
77 Confronted with the fact of the Argentine passiveness for resolving its past,
in the 90's several European judges began to request the extradition of members of
the military dictatorship charged with forced disappearances of European citizens.
See e.g., Victor Hugo Ducrot, El juex Marquevich encierra a Videla con argumentos
de Garz6n, EL MUNDO, July 16, 1998 (Spanish news article concerning the request
by Spanish Judge Baltazar Garz6n) available at http://www.elmundo.es/1998/07/
16/internacional/16N0043.html (last visited Apr. 11, 2008); Gerardo Young, De-
tienen a Videla en un caso por robo de bebds, CLARfN, June 10, 1998 (Argentine
news article concerning one French extradition request) available at http://www.
clarin.com/diario/1998/06/10/t-00201d.htm (last visited Apr. 11, 2008); Argentine
'dirty war' officer sought, BBC NEWS, June 30, 2001, (involving an Italian request)
available at http://news.bbc.co.uk/2/hi/americas/1416020.stm (last visited Apr. 11,
2008). Similar requests were introduced by Switzerland and Sweden.
78 See Decree 1581/2001, Dec. 17, 2001, 29797 B.O. available at http://infoleg.
mecon.gov.ar/infolegInternetanexos/70000-74999/70794Jnorma.htm (last visited
Apr. 11, 2008). The decree has been included in the article by M6nica P. Karayan,
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but it even contained considerable substantive mistakes. 79 Ten
days later, the government of De la Rua fell in the midst of po-
litical and economical turmoil, but the decree survived the sub-
sequent transitory governments due to the pressure of the
military.80
In June of 2002, the German government again decided to
play a role challenging the legality of this new impediment
before the Argentine Supreme Court.8 ' As already explained,
the Argentine extradition law8 2 allowed an extradition request
only by the diplomatic channels of the foreign ministry. 83 Ger-
many wanted to request the extradition of two members of the
military presumed to have actively participated in the killing of
Elizabeth KAssemann.8 4 To avoid the sure refusal at the for-
eign office by application of the new "official doctrine," the Ger-
man Government used the gap left by the bad drafting of article
3 of the decree 5 and presented the new extradition request and
the provisory arrest request with all due documentation simul-
taneously both upon the federal justice and the ministry of for-
eign affairs.8 6 It was clear that the request was going to be
stopped at the Argentine Foreign Ministry but Germany
wanted to bring the case before the Argentine Supreme Court
La "doctrina'del Decreto 1581, 16 CUADERNOS DE DOCTRINA Y JURISPRUDENCIA PE-
NAL 197, 234 (annex) (2003).
79 See Karayan supra note 79, at 200. In spite of the criticism, the Decree
remained in force until being derogated in 2003 by Decree 420/03, July 28, 2003,
30200 B.O.
80 See Carlos Ares, El torturador Astiz, en prisi6n preventive, EL PAfs, Dec. 29,
2001, available at http://www.elpais.com/articulo/internacional/torturador/Astiz/
prisionlpreventiva/elpepiint/20011229elpepiint_10/Tes (last visited Apr. 11, 2008).
81 The Decree 1581/01 was also badly drafted. After a long list of more than 50
considerations the decree declared its applicability to every foreign extradition re-
quest. Article 3 of the Decree stated: The request for provisional arrest will be sent
to the judge with jurisdiction leaving notice that the Ministry of Foreign Affairs
will act in accordance with this decree in front of a possible case of extradition
["Las solicitudes de arresto provisorio se enviardn al juez competente dejando con-
stancia que el Ministerio de Relaciones Exteriores, Comercio International y Culto
actuard de acuerdo al presente decrecto frente a un eventual pedido de extradition."]
82 See Law 24.767, supra note 74.
83 See id. art.19.
84 See supra note 79. The members of the military accused were General Juan
Bautista Sasiaifi who has been chief of the Federal Police during the dictatorship,
and Major Pedro Dur.n Saenz who presumably was in charge of the kidnapping of
Kdssemann.





and any judicial denial automatically will resend the case to the
high tribunal. The intervening judge resolved first to accept
Germany as a party in the proceeding, but secondly refused to
concede the provisory arrest based on the "official doctrine" de-
cree.8 7 That was enough to allow the German appeal to the Su-
preme Court.
Despite the fact that at the end of the judicial proceeding,
the German appeal lost its original purpose when the so-called
impunity laws were repealed and was finally denied invoking
procedural reasons, it was an element of pressure that contrib-
uted to the final decision of the Argentine Supreme Court.88 In
July of 2007, the Supreme Court of Argentina declared uncon-
stitutional the presidential pardons conceded by President
Menem benefiting members of the past military dictatorship.8 9
The case involved some of the accused in the Kassemann case
mentioned above. The decision pointed out that amnesties and
presidential pardons cannot be conceded in cases of crimes
against humanity. 90 However, the decided case brought some
conflict between the principle of res judicata in cases already
resolved by the tribunal, and constitutional issues related to the
recognized independence of the executive to concede some par-
dons in cases already decided.91 One dissenting judge who had
been heavily engaged in international criminal law as a mem-
ber of the ad hoc International Criminal Tribunal for the former
Yugoslavia expressed her concerns about this decision, issuing
a dissenting opinion. 92 She affirmed that a presidential pardon
of an accused person is a clear interference from the executive
power on the judiciary. 93 However, when the Supreme Court in
a prior case94 had already resolved the constitutionality of cer-
87 See id.
8 See "Ram6n Camps," supra note 4.
89 See CSJN, 13/7/2007, "M. 2333. XLII. y otros 'Mazzeo, Julio Lilo y otros si
rec. de casaci6n e inconstitucionalidad'," (in Spanish), available at http://www.der-
echos.org/nizkor/arg/doc/riveros5.html (last visited Mar. 13, 2008).
90 See id.
91 See id.
92 See id. at 125.
93 See point 5 p. 128.
94 See CSJN, "Aquino resolving the constitutionality of the presidential par-
dons" Fallos 315:2421 (Arg.); CSJN, date, "Riveros" Fallos 313:1392 (prior presi-
dential pardon of one of the accused). One of the judges of the prior cases was
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tain presidential pardons, the case is closed and the principle of
res judicata must prevail.95
b.) Statute of limitations and immunity
In another case resolved by the Argentine courts, Italy re-
quested the extradition of Erich Priebke, a former member of
the SS who, during the Second World War, had played a major
role in the selection and execution of Italian hostages as retalia-
tion for a terrorist attack by the Italian resistance in Rome.96 A
hindrance for conceding the extradition was the tolling of the
statute of limitations for the crime of murder. In 1994, this
crime was the only one in Argentina applicable to fulfill the
double-criminality requirement.9 7 Following the position sus-
tained by Italy in the proceeding, the national prosecutor af-
firmed that the case was one of a crime against humanity and
not a case of murder.98 When conceding the extradition and ac-
cepting this reasoning, the Argentine Supreme Court consid-
ered that no statute of limitations could be invoked against a
prohibition of jus cogens and that the characterization as
crimes against humanity "does not depend on the will of both
intervening states, but on the principles of jus cogens in inter-
national law."99 The case, as it was decided, presented an inter-
pretation of the hierarchy of jus cogens rules, placing it above
the national constitution.100 This interpretation, considered
avant-gardist at the time, was contradicted with the constitu-
tional reform of that same year whose main objective was the
presidential re-election. The constitutional reform created a hy-
Carlos Fayt, who was a member of the posterior court and voted against the deci-
sion of declaring the presidential pardons unconstitutional.
95 See Augusto M. Morello, "Cosa juzgada y seguridad juridica, El caso
'Riveros"' J.A. 2007-III, 628.
96 CSJN, 02/11/1995, "Priebke, E. s/ pedido de extradici6n," J.A. 1996-1-324,
available at http://www.blumkin.com.ar/DIDI/priebke.pdf, see also, JOURNAL DU
DROIT INTERNATIONAL CLUNET 1024 (2006) for the evolution of this process in Italy.
97 See G.A. Res 260 (III), 56 UN Dec. A/6286 (Dec. 9, 1948). See also Decree
No. 6286/56, available at A.D.L.A 1956, XVI-A, 273. Although Argentina had rati-
fied the Convention for the Prevention and Punishment of the Crime of Genocide,
it has neglected to establish in its penal law the crime of genocide as requested by
the Convention.
98 See CSJN, 02/1111995, "Priebke, E. s/ pedido de extradici6n," J.A. 1996-I-
324.





brid category of treaties with "constitutional hierarchy," placing
such specific and mentioned treaties at the same level as the
constitution, 10 1 dragging down what had been considered at the
Priebke case to be beyond the constitutional limit.10 2
For resolving the non-application of the statute of limita-
tions in Priebke, the Argentine Supreme Court relied on a prior
extradition case of another former Nazi, Josef Schwammberger,
where this question was addressed. 10 3 The defenses against the
request were basically two. First, it alleged that Germany
lacked jurisdiction to request the extradition because it was not
the successor of the Third Reich.10 4 This question was of impor-
tance in 1987, two years before the fall of the Berlin wall, when
the Democratic Republic of Germany also claimed to be the suc-
cessor of the German Empire. Second, the defense contended
that the statute of limitations for its crimes had already run out
in Germany.o 5 Both questions were analyzed by an expert
opinion requested by the prosecutor, which affirmed the juris-
diction of the Federal Republic of Germany and explained the
successive extensions of the statutes of limitations for crimes
committed during the Second World War until the declaration
101 See Alberto L. Zuppi, Incorporaci6n de Tratados Internacionales a la Con-
stituci6n Nacional -sus efectos y consecuencias, 4 Colegio Pdiblico de Abogados de la
Capital Federal (2002), available at http://www.dpi.bioetica.org/docdpi/zuppi.htm#
_ftnl (last visited Apr. 11, 2008).
102 Compare current Article 75. 22 of the Argentine Constitution, available at
http://www.argentina.gov.ar/argentina/portal/documentos/constitucion-nacional.
pdf, with the decision CSJN, 2/11/1995, "Priebke, E. s/ pedido de extradici6n," J.A.
1996-1-324.
103 CSJN, 20/03/1990, Schwammberger, Josef s/extradici6n, Fallos 315:256,
available at http://www.icrc.org/ihl-nat.nsf/46707c419d6bdfa24125673e00508145/
ab9bf298639bfe43c125712500499ce7!OpenDocument (last visited Apr. 11, 2008).
104 For decades this problem has been one of the major subjects of legal litera-
ture in Germany. See Georg Ress, DIE RECHTSLAGE DEUTSCHLANDS NACH DEM
GRUNDLAGENVERTRAG VOM 21. DEZEMBER 1972, (1978); Wilhelm K. Geck, Germany
and Contemporary International Law, 9 TEX. INT'L L. J. 263 (1974) with additional
references.
105 See Robert A. Monson, The West German Statute of Limitations on Murder:
A Political, Legal and Historical Exposition, 30 AM. J. COMP. L., 605 (1982). The
statute of limitations of the German Criminal Code - Strafgesetzbuch ["StGB"]-
stated in § 78 a period of 20 years for the crime of murder. In 1965 and 1969, the
text of the StGB was amended excluding the crimes perpetrated during the Nazi
period first and extending the period for crimes punishable with life imprisonment
second. In 1979, a new amendment of § 78 StGB extended the period to 30 years.
A current English translation of the StGB is available at http://www.iuscomp.org/
gla/statutes/StGB.htm#78 (last visited Apr. 11, 2008).
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of their not being subject to any statute of limitations. 10 6
The opinion was ratified in successive instances and
Schwammberger was finally extradited to Germany. 10 7 In all
these cases, the Argentine courts were confronted with different
non-exculpatory defenses, but the qualification of the grave
crimes against humanity was decisive for resolving the matter.
c.) Looking for a Last Instance: The Inter-American Pact
of Human Rights:
The rise of the Inter-American human rights organisms' 08
during the last part of the 20th Century was a consequence of
the authority assumed to investigate human rights violations
by the Inter-American Commission as well as the clear message
pronounced by the jurisprudence of the Inter-American
Court.'0 9 The number of complaints received by the Commis-
sion in recent years is growing exponentially, as the value of
the Inter-American System as a last resort for human rights
106 In 1987, the drafting of § 78 (2) stated: "(2) Serious criminal offenses under
Section 220a (genocide) and Section 211 (murder) are not subject to a statute of
limitations." Since 2002, the crime of genocide, as well as other grave international
crimes, are considered only by the German International Law Penal Code of 26
June 2002 - Vblkerstrafgesetzbuch ["VStGB"] - published in the BGB1. I at 2254.
Art, 5. VStGB states: "The prosecution of crimes pursuant to this Act and the exe-
cution of sentences imposed on their account shall not be subject to any statute of
limitations."
107 See Joseph Schwammberger, 92, Nazi Labor Camp Commander, Dies, N.Y.
TIMES, Dec. 4, 2004, available at http://www.nytimes.com/2004/12/04/obituaries/
04schwammburger.html?_- r=l&oref=slogin (last visited Apr. 11, 2008). In Decem-
ber 2004, Schwammberger died in the German prison. See id.
108 The system emerged from the Charter of the Organization of American
States, available at http://www.oas.org/juridico/English/charter.html (last visited
Apr. 11, 2008), and the American Declaration of the Rights and Duties of Man,
O.A.S. Res. XXX, adopted by the Ninth International Conference of American
States (1948), reprinted in Basic Documents Pertaining to Human Rights in the
Inter-American System, OEA/Ser.L.V/II.82 doc.6 rev.1 at 17 (1992). The Inter-
American Commission on Human Rights was created in 1959 and held its first
session in 1960. In 1969, the American Convention on Human Rights was adopted
-O.A.S.Treaty Series No. 36, 1144 U.N.T.S. 123- and entered into force in 1978.
The Convention also creates the Inter-American Court of Human Rights and de-
fines the functions and procedures of both the Commission and the Court. See In-
ter-American Commission of Human Rights [IHCR], http://www.cidh.org
what.htm (last visited Apr. 11, 2008).
109 See Tom Farer, The Rise of the Inter-American Human Rights Regime: No
Longer and Unicorn, Not Yet an Ox, 19 HUM. RTs. Q. 510 (1997).
22http://digitalcommons.pace.edu/pilr/vol19/iss2/3
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violations has been recognized. 110 The judicial review and the
availability of a contentious jurisdiction within the Inter-Ameri-
can System produced a notable evolution of the attitude of the
member states toward a new respect of human rights protected
by the system. Certainly, still this change should be seen as an
evolving development but the concrete meaning of some deci-
sions has proved to be invaluable. The case of the amnesties and
presidential pardons has been one of the clearest examples of
the value of the Inter-American human rights institutions. In
the case of Barrios Altos the Inter-American Court of Human
Rights decided that:
This Court considers that all amnesty provisions, provisions
on prescription and the establishment of measures designed to
eliminate responsibility are inadmissible, because they are in-
tended to prevent the investigation and punishment of those re-
sponsible for serious human rights violations such as torture,
extrajudicial, summary or arbitrary execution and forced disap-
pearance, all of them prohibited because they violate non-dero-
gable rights recognized by international human rights law."'
This jurisprudence of this case has been followed by the Ar-
gentine Supreme Court when deciding the Simon case already
quoted when resolving the nullity of the impunity laws. 1 2 The
alternative of presenting a case before the Inter-American Com-
mission of Human Rights has shown its merits in cases where
the involved tribunal has been reluctant to act or the investiga-
tion of the case has been burdened by a concrete interest in
some particular result from the involved government. The inter-
national forum offered by the Inter-American Commission is es-
pecially attractive in cases where there is a gross violation of
the due diligence to investigate or to secure the rights of the
victims.
110 See Annual Reports of the Inter-American Commission on Human Rights,
available at http://www.cidh.org/annual.eng.htm (last visited Apr. 11, 2008).
111 See Inter-American Court of Human Rights, Mar. 14, 2001, "Barrios Altos
Case (Chumbipuma Aguirre et al v. Peru," Series C No. 75 [20011 IACHR 5, T 41,
available at http://www.worldlii.orglint/cases/IACHR/2001/5.html (last visited Apr.
11, 2008).
112 See Bakker, supra note 4 at 1106.
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d) The Spanish alternative
Another effective alternative for fighting the reluctance of
Latin American tribunals to cope with the past (as shown by the
case of Pinochet) has been to bring the problem to Spain, where
universal jurisdiction for grave crimes against mandatory
norms, after some initial hesitations, has been accepted. This
happened, for example, with the 2005 decision of the Spanish
constitutional tribunal in favor of the claim of Nobel Peace Prize
recipient Rigoberta Menchi 113 against the former dictator of
Guatemala, Efrain Rios Montt. 114 In December 2007 the Consti-
tutional Court of Guatemala in a criticized decision held that
Spain did not have jurisdiction over crimes committed in Guate-
mala and refused to extradite to that county Efrain Rios Montt
and other former military officers. 115 Notwithstanding the deci-
sion in Guatemala, the Spanish Court, in a much-praised move,
decided to continue to investigate the crimes of genocide, tor-
ture, killings and illegal detentions, committed against Guate-
malan civilians.1 16 When no international tribunal has been
seen as having jurisdiction for the case, and the concerned state
is not ready to begin a prosecution despite the requested per-
son's no longer being protected by immunity, then the subsidi-
ary jurisdiction offered by Spain is a valid and appreciated
alternative.117
113 See Decision of the Spanish Constitutional Court, STC, Sept. 26, 2005, (STC
237), available at http://www.tribunalconstitucional.es/jurisprudencia/Stc2005/
STC2005-237.html (in Spanish) (last visited Mar. 13, 2008).
114 See Herv6 Ascensio, The Spanish Constitutional Tribunal's Decision in
Guatemalan Generals, J. INT'L CRIM. JUST. 1 (2006); Angel S6nchez Legido, La
Prdctica Espaiola en Materia de Jurisdicci6n Universal, available at http://www.
uclm.es/profesorado/asanchez/webdih/03Materiales/ART%C3%8DCULOSPYBIL.
doc (last visited Apr. 11, 2008).
115 See Guatemala: Inconsistent ruling by the Constitutional Court rejects ex-
traditions sought by Spain, Amnesty International Comment, Dec. 21, 2007, avail-
able at http://www.amnesty.org/en/library/asset/AMR34/026/2007/en/AMR34026
2007en.html (last visited Apr. 11, 2008).
116 See Exemplary ruling of the Spanish Audiencia Nacional concerning the
Guatemalan Genocide, FIDH.org, Jan. 16, 2008, available at http://www.fidh.org/
spip.php?article5124 (last visited Apr. 11, 2008).
117 Geoff Pingree & Lisa Abend, Spanish Justice: - Guatemala and Efrain Rios
Montt, THE NATION, Sept. 21, 2006, available at http://www.thenation.com/doc




1) The case of Adolfo Scilingo
Adolfo Scilingo was a member of an infamous Navy squad
acting in Argentina during the 1976-1983 dictatorship. They
kidnapped and caused the disappearance of thousands of
Argentinians, and Scilingo took an active part in the so-called
"death flights."118 Scilingo, in a long interview with a journalist,
acknowledged that he had taken part in several flights over the
Atlantic Ocean in different airplanes from the Argentine forces
where around thirty narcotized detainees, presumed to be con-
sidered missing by public opinion, were dropped into the sea let-
ting them drown. That was the first time that the public heard
a confession of this kind of killings from one of its executors. He
presented himself to the Spanish Judge Garz6n in 1997, was
arrested, and after a long judicial process was convicted. 119 The
conviction of Scilingo was ratified in 2007.120 In this last deci-
sion the Tribunal Supremo considered the defenses adduced by
Scilingo, among others, that the Spanish law on international
crimes declared applicable to the case was issued more than
twenty years after the crimes attributed to Scilingo had been
perpetrated. 12' This would be a violation of the principle of le-
gality reproduced in the Spanish Constitution.1 22 The tribunal
accepted the position of judge Garz6n that the new article of the
Spanish Criminal Code only materialized mandatory prohibi-
tions and rules of international customary law. It was unaccept-
able for the court to consider that Scilingo could have not
realized the criminality of his acts as murder or illegal deten-
tions.1 23 Although among the victims were some Spanish citi-
zens and Scilingo was arrested in Spain, the court considered
118 See HoRATcio VERBITSKY, EL VUELO (1995).
119 See decision available in Spanish at http://www.apdhe.org/Informa-
cionDestacada/documentos/STS0loctO7ScilingoArgentina.pdf; see also Alicia Gil
Gil, The Flaws of the Scilingo Judgment, 3 J. OF INT'L CRIM. JUST. 1082 (2005).
120 See Decision 798/2007 by the Second Chamber of the Tribunal Supremo,
dated October lsr 2007, available at http://www.apdhe.org/InformacionDestacada/
documentos/STS0loct07ScilingoArgentina.pdf (last visited Apr. 11, 2008).
121 See Spanish Criminal Code, art. 607 bis, created after the amendment of
the Criminal Code by Law 15/2003, in force since October 1, 2004, (in Spanish)
available at http://noticias.juridicas.com/basedatos/Penallol0-1995.12t24.html#c
2b (last visited Apr. 11, 2008).
122 See Constituci6n [C.E.], art. 25, (Spain) available at http://constitucion.
rediris.es/legis/1978/ce1978.html (last visited Apr. 11, 2008).
123 See decision quoted at point 5.6.
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the application of universal jurisdiction. 124 It quoted a former
decision of the Constitutional Tribunal deciding that the princi-
ple of universal jurisdiction recognized in Spanish Law is abso-
lute, without restrictions and without hierarchical
subordination to other principles ruling jurisdiction of the
courts. As a consequence, the criteria for determining universal
jurisdiction would depend on the particular nature of the prose-
cuted crimes. 125
2) The case of Ricardo Cavallo
Ricardo Cavallo was a former member of one of the most
terrible military squads that kidnapped and forced the disap-
pearance civilians during the 1976-1983 military dictatorship in
Argentina. In addition to these charges, he was presumed to
have obtained economic benefits dispossessing his victims from
their property. The case of Cavallo is somehow paradigmatic be-
cause he was arrested in Mexico in 2000 when he was identified
by some of his victims and a reporter who had brought the story
to the press and the public opinion. 126 Judge Baltasar Garz6n of
Spain issued an arrest warrant and an extradition request
against Cavallo for the crime of genocide, tortures and forced
disappearances. 127 It was a case in which a person accused of
human rights violations in one country, Argentina, was sought
for trial in a second nation, Mexico, and extradited by a third,
Spain, on the principle of universal jurisdiction that the laws
governing crimes against humanity know no borders.128 Cavallo
alleged in his defense that he was obeying orders as member of
the armed forces, but the Mexican Supreme Court stated in a
124 See Ley Orgdnica del Poder Judicial (LOPJ), art. 23.4 (Spain).
125 See STC 237/2005.
126 See Virginie Ladisch, Argentine Military Officer Extradited to Spain on Ge-
nocide Charges, July 10, 2003, Crimes of War Project, available at http://www.
crimesofwar.org/onnews/news-argentina.html (last visited Apr. 11, 2008).
127 See Auto solicitando la extradici6n de Ricardo Miguel Cavallo, Sept. 12,
2000, available at http://www.derechos.org/nizkor/argespana/cavallo2.html (last
visited Apr. 11, 2008).





memorable opinion that the defense of superior orders is of no
avail when dealing with crimes against humanity. 129
At the time of Cavallo's arrest in Mexico, the afore-men-
tioned impunity laws were still in force in Argentina and it
seems problematic that he could have been prosecuted there.130
After being imprisoned in Mexico for almost three years, in
2003 he was extradited to Spain.13 ' As it has been explained,
Argentina finally nullified the impunity laws and opened again
the related cases for the prosecution of members of the military
forces. An Argentine judge then requested from Spain the extra-
dition of Cavallo. After some initial investigation, the Spanish
Audiencia Nacional decided in favor of extraditing Cavallo to
Argentina considering that the Argentine judiciary have a bet-
ter jurisdiction that the one cited by Spain. In May 25, 2007132
the Spanish Council of Ministers demanded from Mexico au-
thorization for the re-extradition of Cavallo and having ob-
tained it, in the last day of March 2008 with the consent of
Cavallo he was extradited again this time to Argentina.
CONCLUSION
Besides the problems of reforming the constitutional texts
to adapt to the ICC, Latin America must overcome its reluc-
tance to deal with its past openly and with impartiality. The
trend initiated in international criminal law is irreversible and
must be confronted, and one may hope that in the near future
human rights violators will not find a place to hide. The Inter-
129 See Jos6 de Jests Gudifio Pelayo, Contemporary Judicial Dialogue in Mex-
ico, 5 MEXICAN L. REV. (Jan-Jun. 2006), available at http://info8.juridicas.unam.
mx/cont/5/arc/arc3.htm.
130 See id.
131 According to Judge Garz6n, Ricardo Miguel Cavallo was accused of having
participated in 227 kidnappings and acts of torture concerning 110 people, as well
as in the kidnapping of 16 babies who had been removed from their mothers who
were in prison. Originally the case of Cavallo was linked with other case of an
Argentine naval officer Adolfo Scilingo. See Richard J. Wilson, Spanish Supreme
Court Affirms Conviction of Argentine Former Naval Officer for Crimes Against
Humanity, 12 ASIL Insights (2008), American University, WCL Research Paper
No. 2008-30, (discussing the case of Scilingo), available at http://ssrn.comlab-
stract=1090245. See also Trial Watch Report on Ricardo Miguel Cavallo, http://
www.trial-ch.org/en/trial-watch/profile/db/facts/ricardo-miguel-cavallo_48.html
(last visited Apr. 11, 2008).
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American Court of Human Rights stated in the case Barrios
Altos:133
[Tihat all amnesty provisions, provisions on prescription and the
establishment of measures designated to eliminate responsibility
are inadmissible, because they are intended to prevent the inves-
tigation and punishment of those responsible for serious human
rights violations such as torture, extrajudicial, summary or arbi-
trary execution and forced disappearance, all of them prohibited
because they violate non-derogable rights recognized by interna-
tional human rights law.' 34
Conceding a presidential pardon or deciding an amnesty is
a classical example of a sovereign act. The decision of the execu-
tive power to pardon what the judiciary already condemned, or
the congress rendering a law in a matter on national policy
agreeing to an amnesty on a related matter, are both acts of
exercise of sovereignty. The beneficiaries of these kinds of non-
exculpatory defenses will be shielded against prosecution or en-
forcement. However, in spite of the majestic exercise of sover-
eign power, a presidential pardon or a congressional amnesty of
crimes against jus cogens prohibitions will be considered by an
unbiased domestic or international tribunal as null and non-ex-
istent. The Latin American journey to the complete reestablish-
ment of human rights in the region is far from being concluded.
Adjusting its domestic orders to the requirement of the Rome
Statute will help to consolidate democracy in the region. The
exposure to the international arena has shown to be an effective
means to propel the necessary debate in a society too much ac-
customed to totalitarianism.
133 See Barrios Altos Case, Mar. 14, 2001, Inter-Am. Ct. H.R. (ser. C.) No. 75 at
105, $ 41, available at http://wwwl.umn.edu/humanrts/iachr/C/75-ing.html.
134 Id.
[Vol. 19:195
28http://digitalcommons.pace.edu/pilr/vol19/iss2/3
